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Debt Market Illiquidity and Correlated Default Risk
Abstract

We empirically test the theoretical prediction of the impact of debt market
liquidity on correlated default risk. Confirming the theory, our results
indicate that the lower debt market liquidity, leads to an economically
significant increase in the correlated default risk. Also consistent with
theory, we show that this effect is more pronounced for short-term debt.
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1. Introduction
A crucial issue for bond portfolios is the default correlation between different firms, which undermines
diversification benefits. Thus, understanding the dynamics of correlated default risk is essential to fixedincome pricing and risk management and is of great interest to academicians and practitioners. The recent
financial crisis in particular has sparked interest in understanding correlated default risk and the role played
by liquidity and short-term debt. As pointed out by Nickerson and Griffin (2017), credit rating agencies
made official statements expressing concerns about default correlation (Moody’s, 2010; Standard & Poor’s,
2013). In their “Material Loss Reports”, the FDIC and OCC attribute the banking failure in the recent crisis
to the interplay of liquidity and credit risk. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the failures of Lehman
Brothers and Bear Sterns during the recent financial crisis was mainly due to their significant exposure to
short-term debt (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Krishnamurthy, 2010). Our knowledge, however, about
factors driving default correlation is limited. Das et al. (2007) and Duffie et al. (2009) show that commonly
used observable variables have little power in explaining firms’ default correlation.
We use the insight of the theoretical model of He and Xiong (2012b) to examine the dynamics of
correlated default risk. To understand the connection between rollover risk and credit risk, He and Xiong
(2012b) develop a theoretical model; and one of the implications of their model is that debt market liquidity
can be a common factor explaining firms’ correlated default risk and that this risk is more pronounced for
short-term debt. Guided with this theory, our paper contributes to this debate by providing first empirical
evidence on the dynamics of correlated default risk and its significant relationship with short-term debt and
debt market liquidity.
Prior research in this area has focused predominantly on the credit spread puzzle (Collin-Dufresne et
al., 2001; Eom et al., 2004; Longstaff et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Covitz and Downing, 2007; Ericsson
et al., 2009; Huang and Huang, 2012), on measuring bond liquidity and its pricing implications in the bond
market (Ericsson and Renault, 2006; Lin, Wang, and Wu, 2011; Bao et al., 2011; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012;
de Jong and Driessen, 2012; Friewald et al., 2012; Acharya et al., 2013; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014;
Pelizzon et al, 2016; Docherty and Easton, 2016; Bongaerts, de Jong, and Driessen, 2017), and on
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measuring credit risk premium and its relative magnitude vis-à-vis liquidity premium (Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek, 2012; Schwert, 2017; Schwarz, 2017; Berndt et al., 2018). Theoretical literature also investigates
the interaction between liquidity and credit risk premium (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005; Ericsson and
Renault, 2006; Wagner, 2007; Cai and Thakor, 2008; Gatev et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2010; Acharya and
Viswanathan, 2011; Gorton and Metrick, 2011; He and Xiong, 2012a,b; He and Milbradt, 2014). Our paper
differs from these studies, as our research question is fundamentally different. We borrow from this
literature and use developed measures of bond market liquidity and credit risk premium to investigate the
dynamics of correlated default risk and test the predictions made in the theoretical literature. Therefore, the
most notable difference between our paper and these studies is the use of a measure of correlated default
risk (recently developed by Javadi et al, 2017) as the dependent variable instead of other traditional
measures such as corporate bond yield spread, CDS spread, sovereign bond spreads, etc.
This article makes two key contributions. First, consistent with the theory, we find empirical support
for the notion that lower debt market liquidity has a positive and economically significant effect on
correlated default risk and that the effect is stronger for speculative issues and during the recent crisis. This
result is consistent with He and Milbradt (2014) who develop and solve a theoretical model that endogenizes
the bond market illiquidity in the He and Xiong (2012b) framework. It is also in line with the empirical
findings of Gopalan et al (2014) who show that firms with greater exposure to rollover risk have lower
credit quality and that the effect is more pronounced for non-investment grade firms and during recessions.
However, while their focus is on the impact of rollover risk on credit rating, we study the effect on correlated
default risk of debt market liquidity. Second, also confirming the theory, we provide evidence that default
correlation is significantly higher for short-term debt. Our results are consistent with those in Diamond and
He (2014) in that they both show the negative aspect of short-term debt. However, our focus is on the
correlated default risk whereas they study the effect of debt maturity on debt overhang and firm investment.
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Furthermore, this result is also consistent with the theoretical prediction in He and Xiong (2012a) and
Morris and Shin (2016)1.
Overall, our empirical evidence, at the very least, shows the necessity of better understanding the
dynamics of correlated default risk, highlights its complicated relationship with debt maturity and bond
market liquidity, and calls for theoretical models to incorporate the interplay of these factors. These new
models can guide empirical research, and together they have significant implications for all the stakeholders
in the fixed income market including regulators and policy makers.
2. Theoretical Framework
He and Xiong (2012b) develop a theoretical model that analyzes the interaction between bond market
liquidity and credit risk premiums. In the presence of an illiquid debt market, to keep the firm alive, equity
holders must absorb rollover losses when replacing maturing bonds with new bond issues. Debt market
illiquidity depresses the price of newly issued bonds and leads to an increase in rollover losses to equity
holders. Thus, absorbing rollover losses by equity holders is rational if the value of keeping the firm alive
outweighs rollover losses. A key implication of the He and Xiong (2012b) model is that due to the rise in
rollover costs, the deterioration in debt market liquidity can lead equity holders to choose to default at a
higher threshold. Based on this key insight, they suggest that debt market liquidity can be a common factor
explaining firms’ default correlation.
Moreover, their model signifies the link between maturity risk and rollover risk. Consistent with Leland
and Toft (1996), He and Xiong (2012b) prove that the firm’s default boundary increases as its debt maturity
decreases and that a deterioration in debt market liquidity exacerbates this effect. Their model suggests that
the effect of rollover risk is more pronounced for short-term debt since it exposes equity holders to larger
rollover losses. Thus, firms with short-term debt due to their greater rollover losses have a higher default

1

Our paper is different from two recent papers by Nickerson and Griffin (2017) and Phelan (2017). We are interested
in the relationship between correlated default risk and debt market liquidity and debt maturity. However, the former
paper develops a framework to estimate realized default correlation in structured securities and contrasts that to the
assumptions used by credit rating agencies, whereas the latter develops a theoretical model that implies that correlated
loan payoffs can give rise to financial intermediation. Our results also complement the findings in Pu and Zhao (2012),
who find significant comovement in CDS spreads.
4

threshold and face greater default risk. Therefore, a deterioration in debt market liquidity that raises the
default boundary across the board makes correlated defaults more probable for these firms. In other words,
the theory predicts that correlated default risk is more pronounced for short-term debt.
A direct test of these predictions has been a challenge because it requires a reliable measure of
correlated default risk, which was not previously available in the literature. In this paper, however, we use
a measure of correlated default risk to empirically test these theoretical predictions. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first empirical study to shed more light on the relationship between correlated
default risk, debt market liquidity, and maturity.
3. Data
Das, Freed, Geng, and Kapadia (2006) and Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) show that correlation
in defaults primarily stems from the correlation in default probabilities. Using this insight and following
Javadi et al. (2017), we construct a measure of default correlation using five-year credit default swap (CDS)
spreads. The CDS spreads are from July 2002 to August 2013 and are obtained from MARKIT. It is a wellestablished fact that CDS contracts are extremely liquid and efficient. More specifically, CDS spreads
reflect the changes in the credit risk of the reference entities faster than their corresponding fixed-income
issues (Blanco et al., 2005; Ericsson et al., 2009). These characteristics make CDS spreads an ideal proxy
for default probabilities (Friewald et al., 2014). Furthermore, using correlation of CDS spreads avoids
reliance on structural assumptions under the risk neutral framework to infer default probabilities. Thus, the
correlated movements in CDS spreads can be an efficient and close proxy for the correlated movements in
the respective reference entities’ default probabilities. Therefore, the measure of default correlation for
issue i is defined as the monthly average pairwise correlation in daily CDS spreads of issue i with all other
issues in each month.
The focus of this study is to analyze the effect of debt market liquidity on the correlated default risk.
Thus, it is crucial to have a reliable liquidity measure for the bond market. Corporate bonds are far less
liquid than equities; a very small number of bonds trade on a daily basis. Consequently, it is necessary to
have a liquidity proxy that goes beyond the standard transaction-based measures. Following Friewald et al.
5

(2012), we construct a bond-level Amihud measure of illiquidity; then, following Bao et al. (2011), we
aggregate this measure to market level by taking its monthly average across all issues. Amihud is the price
impact of trading on bonds, and it is calculated as an individual bond’s average absolute return scaled by
its trading volume.
1
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We obtain the prices and volume from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE); to
calculate the bond returns, we follow Bessembinder et al. (2009). We specifically focus on the Amihud
measure because prior research finds that it captures illiquidity more effectively than other measures (DickNielsen et al., 2012; Friewald et al., 2012).
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables. Our sample has 71,853 monthly observations
that span from July 2002 and August 2013. The average default correlation in our sample is 0.29, with a
standard deviation of 0.24 reflecting substantial variation in this measure. In an average month, debt market
illiquidity has a mean value of 0.1. 67% of our sample is comprised of investment-grade issues and the
mean time to maturity is a little over 9 years. An average firm in our sample has a volatility of 30% with a
leverage ratio of about 29%.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Stats
Default Correlation

Amihud
Investment Dummy
Maturity (in Years)
Leverage
Volatility
r10 (%)
SP Return (%)
Slope
ebp (%)

N
71,853

Mean
0.290

Median
0.290

Stddev
0.24

Debt Market Illiquidity Measure
134
0.100
0.090
0.06
Firm Characteristics
71,853
0.670
1.000
0.47
71,853
9.310
6.420
8.69
71,853
0.290
0.240
0.18
71,853
0.300
0.240
0.21
Macro Factors
134
3.600
3.840
(0.98)
134
0.473
1.106
(4.40)
134
1.570
1.770
(0.92)
134
-0.011
-0.255
(0.79)
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4. Empirical Findings
4.1

Main Findings
To study the effect of debt market liquidity on the correlated default risk, we employ the following

panel regression as our baseline model.
Def. Corr.i,t = α + β1 Illiquidityt + β2 Xi,t + εi,t

(2)

where DefCorri,t is the measure of default correlation as defined earlier and Illiquidityt is the measure of
debt market illiquidity; X is a vector of control variables that includes two indicator variables for crisis
(between December 2007and June 2009 as defined by the Fed) and investment grade issues, excess bond
premium (ebp), leveragei,t, 10-year Treasury note (r10), return on S&P500 (SP Returnt), slope of the yield
curve (Slopet ), and Volatilityi,t. In choosing these variables, we followed the literature (Collin-Dufresne et
al., 2001; Ericsson et al., 2009; Das et al., 2007; Duffie et al., 2009;Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012).2
Standard errors are clustered by firm.
To test the prediction that default correlation is more pronounced for short-term issues, we augment
this model by including two different measures of maturity: y_25p and y_75p are indicator variables that
are equal to 1 if the maturity of a bond is in the first and fourth quartile of maturity distribution in our
sample, respectively. The other measure is time to maturity, expressed in years, for each bond issue in each
month.
Table 2 presents the results of our panel regressions for our variable of interest. The coefficient on
Amihud, the measure of debt market illiquidity, is positive and significant in all specifications. Model 2
provides the first empirical evidence consistent with the He and Xiong (2012b) theory that default
correlation is more pronounced for short-term debt. Default correlation is about 3% higher for short-term
bonds, as evident from the positive significant coefficient of y_25p. Also consistent with the theory, we
find the opposite to be true for long-term bonds. The coefficient on y_75p is negative significant, indicating
that default correlation is lower for long-term bonds. The last two models include the control variables.

2

Appendix provides more detail information on these variables and their data sources.
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Model 5 substitutes the two y_25p and y_75p indicator variables for maturity. The negative coefficient on
maturity (coefficient estimate = -0.014; t-stat = -7.03) is consistent with our previous findings and indicates
one-year shorter maturity increases default correlation by about 1.4% after controlling for other variables.
In both models, the size of Amihud coefficient increases to 1.7 and remains significantly positive. To get a
sense of the economic significance of the impact of debt market illiquidity on default correlation, we use
the standard deviation of Amihud that is reported in Table 1. Focusing on Models 4 and 5, Amihud’s
coefficient of 1.7 indicates that a one standard deviation (0.06) increase in Amihud illiquidity (i.e., one
standard deviation deterioration in debt market liquidity) leads to about a 10.2% increase in default
correlation. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between default correlation and debt market illiquidity as
measured by Amihud.

Table 2: Default Correlation and Base Model Debt Market Liquidity
VARIABLES
Amihudt
y_25pi,t
y_75pi,t
Investment Dummyi,t
Crisist
Volatilityi,t
Leveragei,t
r10t
SP Returnt
Slopet
ebpt
Maturityi,t
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Default Correlation as Dependent Variable
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.932***
0.830***
1.736***
1.784***
(32.990)
(20.780)
(24.930)
(25.520)
0.036***
0.032***
0.024***
(7.860)
(6.770)
(5.020)
-0.032***
-0.028***
-0.016**
(-4.770)
(-4.010)
(-2.140)
-0.036***
-0.022***
-0.016**
(-5.130)
(-3.180)
(-2.460)
0.028***
0.112***
0.112***
(4.290)
(17.500)
(17.540)
-0.051***
-0.042**
(-2.810)
(-2.350)
-0.080**
-0.066*
(-2.210)
(-1.960)
-0.017***
0.003
(-6.010)
(0.680)
-0.099**
-0.076*
(-2.530)
(-1.950)
0.003
-0.000
(0.980)
(-0.010)
-0.115***
-0.118***
(-19.970)
(-20.520)
-0.014***
(-7.030)
0.189***
0.189***
0.218***
0.186***
0.242***
(66.180)
(62.750)
(35.040)
(10.940)
(12.980)
(1)
0.946***
(33.840)

71,853
0.0576

71,853
0.0604
8

71,853
0.0632

71,853
0.0980

71,853
0.1026

This figure presents the 12-month moving average of Aggregate Default Correlation (left axis) and Amihud Illiquidity
measure over our sample period (right axis). The shaded area, December 2007 to June 2009, reflects financial crisis.

Amihud alone can explain about 6% of the variation in default correlation. Inclusion of other control
variables increases the R2 to about 10%. This means around 90% of the variation in default correlation is
left unexplained. Thus, while debt market liquidity has some explanatory power and has an economically
significant impact, it is one of the factors - not the main common factor - driving default correlation. In fact,
the R2s of our models are consistent with earlier findings that suggest limited explanatory power of
observable firm-level and macroeconomic covariates (Das et al., 2007; Duffie et al., 2009).
Control variables predominantly have the expected signs. The crisis indicator variable has a positive
significant coefficient, indicating that the default correlation rose significantly during the crisis. Similarly,
the negative coefficient of the return on the S&P500 composite index implies that the correlation increases
subsequent to a market downturn. This is consistent with a known empirical regularity that asset
correlations increase following a market decline (Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Das and Uppal, 2004).
9

Investment-grade issues have a lower default correlation. This is intuitive since these issues have a lower
default boundary that makes them less exposed to default correlation. Negative coefficient of the yield on
the 10-year Treasury note (r10) is consistent with Merton-type models. Overall, the default correlation
measure moves as expected with structural variables that prior research shows to drive the correlation in
default probabilities.
4.2

Robustness Check
While earlier work such as Longstaff et al. (2005) assumed that CDS include only credit risk, following

the financial crisis the more recent literature acknowledges that CDS spreads also include a liquidity
component (see for example Bongaerts et al., 2011; Tang and Yan, 2007; Junge and Trolle, 2015). In
addition to the liquidity component, the recovery rate and counterparty risk can also affect CDS spreads.
However, Arora, Gandhi, and Longstaff (2012) show that the economic impact of counterparty risk on CDS
spreads is negligible: 645 basis points increase in the credit risk of a CDS dealer leads to only one basis
point decrease in the CDS spread the dealer charges. Therefore, counterparty risk has little to no economic
impact on correlation in CDS spreads. Moreover, the literature shows that recovery rates are very persistent
and thus they are assumed to be constant (Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner, 2014; Berndt, Douglas, Duffie,
and Ferguson, 2017; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Hull, Predescu, and White, 2004; Altman and Kishore,
1996; Keenan, Shtogrin, and Soberhart, 1999; and Eom, Helwege, and Huang, 2004). Particularly in this
analysis, given our one-month estimation horizon, we can assume that recovery rates are time-invariant
over one month and therefore have no meaningful impact on CDS spread correlation. But to ensure that our
measure of correlated default risk does in fact reflect correlated default risk and not the potential
confounding effect of recovery rate and the liquidity in the CDS market, we orthogonalize this measure to
correlation in CDS liquidity and recovery rates.
Following previous studies by Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Friewald, Wagner, and Zechner (2014), and
Qiu and Yu (2012), we use MARKIT’s number of contributors (market-makers) for each CDS spread as a
proxy for CDS liquidity. Recovery rates are also obtained from MARKIT. Correlation in CDS liquidity for
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issue i is defined as the monthly average pairwise correlation in the daily number of contributors of issue i
with all other issues in each month. We calculate the correlation in the recovery rates in the same way. We
orthogonalize the default correlation measure by calculating the residual from regressing default correlation
measure on correlation in CDS spreads and correlation in recovery rates. Then, we run our model for this
orthogonalized measure. Results are reported in Table 3.

Table 3: Residual Default Correlation and Debt Market Liquidity
VARIABLES
Amihudt
y_25pi,t
y_75pi,t
Investment Dummyi,t
Crisist
Volatilityi,t
Leveragei,t
r10t
SP Returnt
Slopet
ebpt
Maturityi,t
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Residuals of Default Correlation as Dependent Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.846***
0.833***
0.781***
1.628***
1.666***
(30.150)
(29.650)
(19.100)
(23.450)
(24.030)
0.033***
0.029***
0.019***
(7.580)
(6.540)
(4.280)
-0.029***
-0.025***
-0.011
(-4.510)
(-3.770)
(-1.600)
-0.032***
-0.015**
-0.010
(-4.780)
(-2.220)
(-1.610)
0.016**
0.093***
0.094***
(2.460)
(14.940)
(15.020)
-0.034**
-0.027
(-2.000)
(-1.600)
-0.068*
-0.057*
(-1.850)
(-1.670)
-0.013***
0.002
(-5.210)
(0.690)
-0.110***
-0.092**
(-2.830)
(-2.380)
0.015***
0.012***
(4.740)
(3.900)
-0.115***
-0.116***
(-20.100)
(-20.570)
-0.011***
(-6.060)
-0.071***
-0.070***
-0.047***
-0.112***
-0.067***
(-24.670)
(-23.070)
(-7.320)
(-6.830)
(-3.780)
71,853
0.0472

71,853
0.0496

71,853
0.0513

71,853
0.0876

71,853
0.0906

Results in Table 3 paint the same picture. The coefficient on debt market illiquidity has a positive and
economically significant impact on default correlation that is comparable to that of Table 2. Short-term
bonds are more susceptible to default correlation as evident by coefficients on y_25p, y_75p and maturity.
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5. Conclusion
Using a newly developed measure of correlated default risk, we provide insight regarding the
relationship between debt market illiquidity and correlated default risk. Specifically, we empirically test
the predications of He and Xiong (2012b) theory. We find an empirical evidence consistent to the He and
Xiong (2012b) theory that suggests that debt market illiquidity can be a factor driving correlated default.
Moreover, as predicted by their theory, we show that correlated default risk is stronger for shorter-term
debt. Overall, while our results are mainly consistent with the theory’s predictions, the relatively small R2s
of our models indicate that debt market liquidity is one factor, among others, driving default correlation
and is not the main common factor.
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7. Appendix: List of Variables
Crisist

An indicator variable that equals one in the year-months spanning December 2007
to June 2009,3 and zero otherwise.

ebpt

Is excess bond premium, which represents the risk premium or average price of
bearing exposure to credit risk in excess of the compensation for expected defaults,
as estimated by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012).4

Investment
Gradei,t

A dummy variable that equals one if the bond issue’s rating is at least BBB (or its
equivalent depending on the rating agency, as reported by Mergent FISD), and
zero otherwise.

Leveragei,t

Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we calculate the firm’s leverage ratio as
the book value of debt divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the
book value of debt. we obtain equity valuation from CRSP, which we match to the
most recent quarterly book value of debt obtained from COMPUSTAT.

r10t

Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009), among others,
the riskless rate is proxied by the yield on the 10-year Treasury note.

SP Returnt

Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we use the monthly return on the S&P500
composite index to control for overall market condition. Data is obtained from
CRSP.

Slopet

Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009), among others,
we define slope as the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields.

Volatilityi,t

We use the firm’s 30-day implied volatility as reported by OptionMetrics on the
first day of the month to control for forward-looking measure of the firm’s
volatility.

We define the period as specified by the Federal Reserve. See “The Great Recession of 2007-09” (Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 2013).
4
We use the ebp data provided at: http://people.bu.edu/sgilchri/Data/data.htm
3
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